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The Invariance Proposition in Baseball: New Evidence 
 
Abstract: This paper considers the change in revenue sharing in Major League Baseball that 
occurred prior to the 2007 season and its effects on parity via its effects on marginal revenues. 
Based on the results from a empirical specification for team revenue, we find evidence that the 
reduction in revenue sharing increased marginal revenue by approximately the same amount for 
both small and large market clubs despite other differences in how small and large market club 
revenues are determined. The upshot of this result is that the modest change in revenue sharing 
had little to no effect on league parity in the three seasons following its implementation. The 
well-known invariance proposition in the economics of sport literature that predicts this result 
appears to hold. 
 
Key words: baseball, revenue sharing, parity 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The invariance proposition is debatably the most fundamental result to arise from the 
economics of professional sport literature. As originally formulated by Rottenberg (1956), the 
invariance proposition states that the ultimate distribution of player talent among teams in a 
league is identical regardless of whether players (free agency) or owners (reserve clause) own the 
property rights to player talent. The proposition assumes that cash sales of players is allowed. 
Since cash sales are uncommon now in North American professional sports leagues and the 
reserve clause has long since fallen, the invariance proposition has assumed a different form, that 
revenue sharing has no effect on league parity. This can be shown to be a natural outcome of the 
original form of the invariance proposition as demonstrated in Fort and Quirk (2005) with a 
closed supply of talent. 
The economics of professional sports literature has many theoretical studies that explore 
the effects of revenue sharing on league parity in a two-team or N-team professional sports 
league. The theoretical results on parity can be neatly divided into whether the club owner is a 
profit-maximizer or win-maximizer (with a non-negative profit constraint) and whether the stock 
of league talent is open (Cournot-Nash talent conjecture) or closed. The distinction has tended to 
divide economists between North America (profit-maximization) and Europe (win-
maximization) with no resolution.  
European scholars frequently make the assumption that owners are win-maximizers that 
face a non-negative profit constraint which leads to a different set of results regarding the 
invariance proposition. This assumption has found recent empirical support in Garcia-del-Barrio 
and Szymanski (2009) for European football leagues but the lack of accurate financial data 
makes testing difficult. Empirical evidence for profit-maximization in North American faces the 
same problems with few only a few empirical efforts  including Stewart et al (1992) and 
Rockerbie (2011) for the National Hockey League. 
Theoretical work on the invariance proposition has been much more forthcoming. 
Kesenne (2004, 2005) demonstrates that revenue sharing worsens parity with profit-maximizing 
owners and improves parity with win-maximizing owners when the supply of talent is open. 
Vrooman (2007) provides an elegant paper that summarizes the results of the debate. Revenue 
sharing in a league composed of profit-maximizing owners reduces competitive balance when 
the stock of talent is open and leaves competitive balance unaffected when the stock of talent is 
closed. With win-maximizing owners, revenue sharing reduces competitive balance regardless of 
whether the stock of talent is open or closed. Of course, Vrooman's (2007) results depend 
somewhat on the form of his revenue function and the contest success function he used, although 
his choices seem reasonable. 
Winfree and Fort (2011) address the apparent inconsistency raised initially by Szymanski 
(2004) regarding the role of a closed stock of league talent in a one-shot static game. Sports 
leagues are typically modeled as a one-shot game in which case the Cournot-Nash talent 
conjecture is the only consistent conjecture while the closed talent supply assumption imposes a 
competitive conjecture.
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 Winfree and Fort (2011) offer a solution to the inconsistency by arguing 
that sports clubs maximize profit by choosing an optimal budget to purchase talent, rather than 
just choosing an optimal stock of talent. Club owners can then possess Cournot-Nash conjectures 
in choosing a budget, yet face a league talent constraint. The upshot is that this richer one-shot 
league model predicts the invariance proposition will hold regardless of open or closed talent 
supply in a profit-maximizing framework.  
The empirical effects of revenue sharing on league parity have been studied much more 
sparsely in the literature, probably due to a lack of reliable revenue data. Estimating the marginal 
revenue product (MRP) of talent for a club is a necessary step in the analysis and there is a 
growing literature in this area with Scully (1974, 1989), Zimbalist (1992), MacDonald and 
Reynolds (1994), Krautmann (1999), Leeds and Kowalewski (2001) as good examples. Most of 
these studies estimate marginal revenue (MR) functions for clubs in order to determine whether a 
player is paid his MRP, but they do not consider the effects of changes in revenue sharing on 
MR.  
Solow and Krautmann (2007), hereafter referred to as SK, do estimate the effects on 
revenue sharing on parity by estimating MR functions for each club in major league baseball 
(MLB). This was made possible by the release of club revenue data in the Blue Ribbon Panel 
report (Levin et al (2000)) originally convened by MLB Commissioner Bud Selig. Skidmore-
Hess and Cox (2002) have questioned the reliability of this data (and we comment on this later in 
this paper. After estimating MR functions for MLB clubs, SK conclude that the expanded 1996 
revenue sharing agreement did not affect league parity despite significantly reducing MR for 
each club, but did lower player salaries significantly. These results are consistent with the so-
called invariance proposition that can be found in some theoretical models.  
Our purpose in this paper is to provide additional evidence on the effects of revenue 
sharing using a different sample period and methodology than that used by SK. We use a sample 
period in which there exists a much more clear change in the revenue sharing agreement than the 
sample period used by SK, allowing for estimation results that are easier to interpret. Our results 
suggest that the changes to the revenue sharing prior to the 2007 season had no effect on league 
parity, suggesting that the invariance proposition is alive and well in North America. In the next 
section, we provide a brief overview of the different revenue sharing arrangements that have 
existed in MLB since 1995. In the third section we determine the effects of revenue sharing on a 
representative club using a standard profit-maximizing equilibrium approach that is prevalent in 
the literature. The fourth section specifies the empirical model and provides estimation results. 
The last section provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. REVENUE SHARING AND PARITY IN MLB SINCE 1995 
The common argument leagues use to justify revenue sharing is that the system 
redistributes revenues to small market clubs that could not otherwise survive. This insures the 
financial viability of the league in the absence of any poor business decisions by its owners. 
Although revenue sharing can be used as a vehicle to increase league profits (Easton and 
Rockerbie (2005)), this explanation of revenue sharing is generally not disputed by economists, 
although Maxcy (2009) found that low revenue clubs divest themselves of talent when revenue 
sharing more extensively. As noted in Rockerbie (2009), the effects of revenue sharing on league 
parity, player salaries and the distribution of talent depend greatly on the nature of the revenue 
sharing agreement. To estimate the effects of revenue sharing, one needs revenue data for clubs 
before and after revenue sharing, or before and after revenue sharing became more or less 
extensive.  
Prior to 1996, MLB utilized an 80-20 gate sharing split between home and visiting clubs 
in the American League (Surdham (2007)). Thus the revenues kept by home clubs and taken 
away by visiting clubs depended to some degree on the league schedule. The National League 
used revenue sharing must less extensively than the American League with the visiting club 
receiving only about $0.50 per ticket sold, working out to roughly a 95-5 gate revenue split. 
From 1996 through 2001, all MLB clubs contributed a percentage of local revenues (gate, 
concession, parking and so on) to a league pool to be divided among all the clubs using a variety 
of different plans. This percentage was subsequently increased to 34% prior to the 2003 season 
and then reduced to 31% for the 2007 season.
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We believe that estimating the effect of enhanced revenue sharing on league parity and 
player salaries will require more revenue data than that used by SK. MLB actually used two 
different pooled revenue sharing systems over the 1996-2001 seasons (Levin et al. (2000), p. 38, 
Dosh (2010)). A straight-pool plan specified that seasons each club contribute 39% of its local 
revenue to a central pool to be divided equally between all clubs. A split-pool plan specified that 
each club contribute only 20% of local revenue to a central pool with 75% of the pooled revenue 
returned to each club using equal shares and the remaining 25% to be distributed unevenly to 
those club’s whose revenue fell below the league average. Net receipts or contributions were 
then calculated for each club and each club was assigned the plan that gave it the most net 
benefit. To complicate matters further, each club paid or received less than the net amount 
determined. Under this hybrid plan, the percentages were 60% in 1996 and 1997, 80% in 1998, 
85% in 1999 and 100% for the 2000 and 2001 seasons.  
By the 2002 season, MLB returned to the straight-pool plan with a 34% contribution rate 
on the justification that clubs close to the average league revenue paid higher marginal tax rates 
on local revenue than clubs well above the average league revenue. The contribution was 
reduced to 31% for the 2007 through 2010 seasons. Regardless, the use of two different revenue 
sharing systems with different contribution percentages makes it very difficult to isolate the 
effects of changes in the contribution rate as many clubs paid and received different effective 
rates. Again it is not clear how league parity and player salaries will respond theoretically under 
the two different systems, so it is difficult to interpret any econometric results that attempt to 
divide the sample into two separate periods. The only sample periods that utilized the same 
revenue sharing system but different contribution rates are the 2002-06 seasons (34%) and the 
seasons after 2006 (31%). It is not clear if the small decrease in the contribution rate will allow 
for an accurate estimation of the effect on marginal revenues and parity. 
The standard deviation of winning percentages is a common measure of parity that is 
simple to calculate and interpret, but not without its critics (Eckard (2001)). Nevertheless we 
calculate this measure of parity in Table 1 for the 1995 to 2009 seasons. Parity appeared to 
worsen from 1995 to 2003 but improve after 2003. It is difficult to associate this parity behaviour 
with changes in the revenue sharing arrangement over the same period, hence little can be gained 
from a casual look at the data, particularly when considering the 2007 reduction in revenue 
sharing. 
 
III. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF REVENUE SHARING ON MARGINAL REVENUE 
We consider how the MR curve shifts with greater revenue sharing in an N team model. 
After revenue sharing, team revenue is given by 
 
    jAi RNRNRR )1()1( 11       (1) 
 
where the j subscript represents every other team in the league besides team 1. Marginal revenue 
for team 1 after revenue sharing is given by  
 
       jA MRNMRNNMR  111 11      (2) 
 
Suppose revenue sharing increases so that  decreases from 1 to 2. The percentage 
change in the marginal revenue is computed as 
 
       NMRMRNNMRMRMR jAAA  1111 11     (3) 
 
If the league is in equilibrium before and after the increase in revenue sharing, it is not 
difficult to show by inserting (2) into (3) and simplifying that a decrease in the revenue sharing 
contribution rate () from 34% to 31% will shift the marginal revenue schedule for each club 
upwards by 8.755% in a 30 team league. Finding a value close to this result in the empirical 
model gives some confirmation that the empirical results are reliable. The shift is greater the 
larger is the number of clubs in the league for a given value of . As revenue sharing is reduced, 
 approaches 1 and the upward shift in marginal revenue diminishes in value asymptotically, for 
a given number of clubs. 
 
IV. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Very little reliable financial data exists for MLB clubs outside of the 1995-2001 period 
covered in the Blue Ribbon Report and certainly not enough to construct a pooled time-series 
cross-section dataset sufficient to estimate revenue functions.
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 The only alternative source is the 
revenue series constructed annually by Forbes magazine (and more distantly Financial World 
magazine) that reaches back to 1990. These numbers are educated estimates of actual total 
revenues that include revenue sharing. Some scholars and pundits have questioned the accuracy 
of the Forbes data (Beamer (2007)) which can only be judged when measured against actual 
revenue data provided by MLB assuming of course that the data provided by MLB is accurate 
and honest. Figure 1 plots total revenue data from the 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2001 seasons taken 
from the Blue Ribbon Report against estimates of total revenue computed by Forbes for the same 
years (data for the 1998 season is not available from Forbes). A simple least squares regression 
model using the MLB data as the dependent variable reports an R-squared of 0.931 and a slope 
0.997 that is statistically significant at 99% confidence and a statistically insignificant intercept. 
The standard error of the regression is $10.2 million or 12.7% of the sample mean total revenue 
reported by MLB but if the two largest revenue observations are dropped from the sample, the 
standard error falls to 10.7%. This standard error is not large in comparison to the average errors 
reported by Fort (2010) for MLB payrolls reported by different sources that had values between 
11.6% and 16.3%. Yet payroll data is frequently used by economists with little regard for its 
inherent error.
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 If one needs a complete revenue dataset for the seasons that utilized the same 
straight-pool revenue sharing plan, the Forbes data is all there is. 
We estimate revenue functions using the same empirical specification as SK over the 
2002 through 2009 seasons. The dependent variable is revenue per game for the ith team for 
season t (REVit/Git) since the total revenue data reported by Forbes includes revenue for playoff 
games. We simply ignore the fact that a playoff game generates more revenue than a regular 
season game, as do SK. The independent variables include winning percentage for the current 
season and winning percentage for the previous season (Wit and Wit-1), as well as a quadratic 
current winning percentage variable (Wit
2
), local area population (POPit), per capital income for 
the local area (INCit), the presence of a new stadium in year t represented by a dummy variable 
(NEWSTDMit) and a dummy variable to control for the presence of two MLB teams in the same 
city or in close proximity (TWOTEAMit).
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 The national consumer price index (1998 = 100) was 
used to deflate the revenue and income data. Finally a dummy variable Dt was included that took 
on the value one in the 2007, 2008 and 2009 seasons to reflect the reduction in revenue sharing. 
With smaller revenue sharing adopted in the 2007 season, the model predicts that 3 > 0. The 
model we estimate is given by 
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Marginal revenue varies over a clubs winning percentage, hence it's derivative is straightforward. 
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itit
it
itititit DNEWSTDMTWOTEAM
POPCPI
INC
POPWWMR 321541321 2     
            (5) 
The main coefficient of interest here is 3 that estimates the shift in the marginal revenue 
function when the revenue sharing contribution was reduced from 34% to 31% in 2007. In order 
to compare the shift in MR across clubs of different market sizes, we split the sample into two 
samples using the median level of real income in each MLB city6. If differences in these shifts 
are detected across the two groups, we may be able to make some comments regarding changes 
in parity. We also subtracted the national television revenue from the Forbes revenue numbers on 
the basis that the 2007 season also saw the adoption of a new, more lucrative national television 
contract (FOX and TBS) for MLB, rising from $16 million per season per club prior to 2007 to 
$28 million per season per club. Segmenting the market sizes by metropolitan population made 
very little difference to estimates, so we do not present those results. 
 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Computing the effects of a change in revenue sharing requires estimation of (4) over the 
2002 through 2009 seasons. Total revenues were taken from Forbes due to the lack of original 
MLB data over the entire sample period. Personal income and population data for metropolitan 
statistical areas were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The consumer price index 
data for each MLB city (2001 = 100) was taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A complete 
list of data sources is available in the appendix. Equation (4) was estimated including fixed 
effects and using cross-section weights (GLS) to correct the coefficient standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity. Toronto and Montreal were excluded from the sample due to the 
unavailability of personal income population data for every year in the sample. The results
7
 for 
each sample appear in Table 2. The models explain real total revenue per game reasonably well 
with adjusted R
2
's of 0.938 and 0.877 for the higher and low real income samples respectively. A 
Wald test rejected the null hypothesis that the two regression models (one for each income 
group) had identical coefficients at a very high level of confidence. Population was found to be 
an important factor in determining club revenues for the low income areas only. Interpreting the 
coefficient is a little tricky. An increase in the metropolitan population of 1000 people increases 
real marginal revenue per game by about $1.95 and increases total real revenue per game by 
$97.50 for a club with a 0.500 winning percentage. Over the course of a season, total revenue 
increases by $7897.50 (81 home games), so marginal and total revenues are not very responsive 
to population increases within each income group. 
Per capita real income was also an important determinant of club revenue for both 
income groups, but more so for the high income group. This could be due to the fact that per 
capita real incomes are closely clustered in the lower income areas, whereas they show a great 
degree of variation in the higher income areas. The presence of a new stadium was also an 
important determinant on club revenue for both high and low income areas, but again more so 
for high income areas where a new stadium contributed almost $39 million over a season for a 
club with a 0.500 winning percentage. The presence of two clubs operating in the same city 
significantly reduced club revenues in high income areas.
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 This result is consistent with the result 
found in Winfree et al (2004). 
Winning percentage is an important determinant of revenue for the high income group, 
but not the low income group. This could be a figment of the sample period as the winning 
percentages for the clubs in the low income group showed little variation, whereas a great deal of 
variation was observed for clubs in the high income group. The winning percentage from the 
previous season has a significant effect on current revenue for the low income group, probably 
due to the effect on season's ticket sales, advertising and local television contracts, and so on that 
are determined in the off-seasons.  
The coefficient of the dummy variable Dt gives an estimate of the shift in the marginal 
revenue with the adoption of the new contribution rate in 2007. Since the contribution rate fell 
from 34% to 31%, the model predicts a positive coefficient and this was the case for both the 
lower income and higher income areas. The level of significance was very high at 99.8% in each 
case. When taken as a percentage of the intercept (coefficient for Wit) for the high income group, 
the shift in the marginal revenue line is about 7.95%. This is close to the 8.71% shift that the 
theoretical model predicts with 14 teams in each of the large and small market sample. To 
evaluate parity effects, it is only the absolute shift in the marginal revenues between lower 
income and higher income areas that is relevant. The coefficients are close in value, in fact, the 
null hypothesis that they are the same value could not be rejected at 95% confidence on the basis 
of a Wald test.
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If we accept the result that parity was unaffected as a result of the 2007 change to the 
revenue sharing agreement, the 7.95% increase in marginal revenue for all clubs (since they must 
be in equilibrium both before and after the change in revenue sharing) suggests that salaries 
could have increased by a similar amount given that MLB has no constraints on salaries other 
than the rather ineffective competitive balance tax that sets an annual maximum threshold for 
team payrolls (of which only a few clubs pay). Determining whether salaries increased as a result 
of less revenue sharing requires that a salary regression be estimated that holds constant various 
player productivity variables and other factors that might determine a players marginal product. 
We leave that for future research. 
 VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite using a different methodological approach, the qualitative results in this paper 
agree with the results of SK, namely that revenue sharing has little to no effect on league parity 
in MLB. Marginal revenues for low real income and high real income clubs shift by the same 
positive amount given a decrease in the degree of revenue sharing from 34% to 31% that 
occurred prior to the 2007 season. In fact the shifts in marginal revenues are close to those 
predicted by an 28-club league model. We found these results to be quite robust to changes in 
measurement and the choice of variables. One might conclude that these results call into question 
prior theoretical results that suggest that revenue sharing does affect parity and the invariance 
proposition does not hold, however the results here only hold for MLB and for a small change in 
revenue sharing. It would be too big a stretch to assume the same result for parity for a much 
larger change in revenue sharing, or even abandoning it altogether.  
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FOOTNOTES 
 
* Thanks to Rodney Fort, John Solow, Anthony Krautmann, Thomas Peeters and seminar 
participants at the 86th annual meetings of the Western Economics Association International, San Diego 
CA, 2011 for useful comments. 
 
1See Bresnahan (1981) for the seminal paper that began this discussion. 
2A good review of how these different revenue sharing plans worked is Dosh (2010). 
3Financial statements for MLB clubs are sometimes leaked by the press or presented voluntarily by MLB 
clubs, but only sporadically. See Rod Fort’s website for limited data for the Seattle Mariners, Milwaukee 
Brewers and Cleveland Indians. More recent data for the Los Angeles Angels, Florida Marlins and 
Pittsburgh Pirates can be found at http://deadspin.com/5615096/mlb-confidential-the-financial-
documents-baseball-doesnt-want-you-to-see-part-1. An update to the Blue Ribbon was produced in 2001 
that provided additional data for the 2000 and 2001 seasons. 
4There are too many references to list completely. A good list is contained in Wiseman and Chatterjee 
(2003). 
5Based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis definitions of metropolitan statistical areas, these cities 
included Anaheim, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Oakland and San Francisco. Winfree et al. (2004) 
find a significant negative effect on attendance for both teams when two teams operate in close proximity. 
6Clubs above the median real income included Anaheim, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Florida (Miami), 
Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Texas (Dallas). Oakland and 
San Francisco are included in the same metropolitan statistical area by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
as are Anaheim and Los Angeles. 
7The weighted average real ticket price for each club (obtained from www.teammarketing.com was 
included as an independent variable , however a Hausmann test could not reject the hypothesis that the 
ticket price was endogenous. The ticket price variable was found to be statistically insignificant after 
utilizing two-stage least squares with the local unemployment rate added as an additional instrument. 
8San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles and Anaheim appeared in the lower income areas, while New York 
and Chicago appeared in the higher income areas. 
9The results are very similar if population is used as the measure of market size to divide the sample. 
 
  
 Table 1 
Standard deviation of winning percentages in MLB 
 National League American League 
1995 0.0615 0.0802 
1996 0.0567 0.0712 
1997 0.0606 0.0639 
1998 0.0871 0.0781 
1999 0.0783 0.0780 
2000 0.0681 0.0560 
2001 0.0829 0.0800 
2002 0.0841 0.1092 
2003 0.0726 0.1010 
2004 0.0695 0.0955 
2005 0.0607 0.0805 
2006 0.0508 0.0768 
2007 0.0492 0.0691 
2008 0.0747 0.0562 
2009 0.0610 0.0771 
 
  
 Table 2 
GLS estimates of revenue equation (4), 2002 through 2009 MLB seasons 
Coefficient Real income < 50th  
percentile 
Real income >= 50th 
percentile 
Constant 706333.9* -131798.8 
Wit 6965.61 42201.50** 
Wit
2 -234.80** -746.84* 
Wit Wit-1 151.91* 35.97 
Wit∙POPit/1000 1.95** 0.51 
Wit∙INCOMEit 6.13* 9.58* 
Wit TWOTEAMit  -1502730* 
Wit NEWSTDMit 5451.21* 9552.10* 
Wit Dt 3159.03* 3359.79* 
Adjusted R2 0.877 0.938 
N 112 112 
** Indicates statistical significance at 90% confidence. * indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence. 
 
  
 Figure 1 
Forbe's estimates of MLB club revenues versus club revenues provided by MLB 
(1996, 1997, 1999, 2001 seasons) 
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